Ayatollah Khamenei’s Coup? Interview with Mehdi Khalaji
13 Jul 2009
translated by kaveh_r | source: DW-World originally published on June 16
What has happened in Iran? Is it one of the usual conflicts between political factions? A manifestation of the ongoing internal dispute over the share of power? In an article published in “Washington Post”, Mehdi Khalaji talks about a «coup». This is an interview with him.
On Monday, June 15, Washington Post published an article by Mehdi Khalaji, Islam expert, political analyst, and a researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His article discusses the current upheavals after presidential elections in Iran. The underlying thesis of the article is expressed in it’s title “Khamenei’s coup”. Our interview with Mehdi Khalaji focuses on this thesis.
DW: Mr. Khalaji, in your article published in the Washington Post you referred to what Mir Hossein Mousavi called “Magical elections” as “Khamenei’s coup”. Other political analysts, however, speculate that a group of revolutionary guards commanders predetermined the result of the election, and that the supreme leader was under their control in some way, or was faced with a fait accompli. What is your argument for the invalidity of this hypothesis?
Mehdi Khalaji: Ayatollah Khamenei, the official and absolute supreme leader, is not just a single person, but the fundamental pillar of an systematic establishment. Military–security networks, religious institutions and organizations (especially the clergy), large-scale business enterprises not under the government’s control, and the judicial system are all part of this integrated and entangled system. Ayatollah Khamenei , as the embodiment of the “absolute supreme leadership” [or Absolute Guardianship of Islamic Jurists (velayat-e motlaghe-ye faghih in Persian)] ideology, is the thread that runs through all these dispersed parts and gives them unity and cohesion.
He is the cornerstone, symbol and the main focus of this establishment. Without his leadership, military commanders would lack ideology and would be unable to communicate with other components of the collection. Without him, there would be a barrier in communication between military-security institutions and the lower layers of society. Complex economic networks would be disintegrated as well.
Ayatollah Khamenei is just as much a “captive” by the military commanders as they are his captives. Without his commanders, he would be nothing, as without him, the commanders would be nothing. The association of this huge hierarchy is based on the supreme leader’s house [what his office is called, a normal phrase used for the offices of Grand Ayatollh’s too]. The boundaries of his house, however, are beyond its physical walls, its invisible walls extend from the streets of Qom [a religious city, largest center of Islamic schools in Iran] to the black lines of the Kayhan newspaper, from Evin prison to his representative offices in colleges and universities. Any small crack in these walls would destroy the entire supreme leader’s house.
“Khamenei’s coup” refers to the wrathful dominance of this hierarchy over other weak “democratic” organs of the Islamic Republic such as the president’s and the parliament. On June 12th, a coup, in the form of an election, happened to bring three decades of grueling challenge between these establishments and weak strains of democratic organs in the Islamic Republic to a determining point.
DW: Does this mean that now the “Sultan” has complete dominance?
Mehdi Khalaji: The supreme leader is not a “Sultan” and the Islamic Republic system is not a Sultanate. Although the system of government tends to run on hierarchy orders, but not all such forms of governments should be reduced to a “Sultanate”. The Islamic Republic is a totalitarian establishment. A totalitarian system is a much more sophisticated and layered system than a Sultanate. It’s more difficult to both establish and overthrow it.
If the Islamic Republic was a Sultanate, it would not have been based on ideology and would not have generated a supporting intellectual disciple. The Islamic Republic has its own Grand Ayatollahs, its own filmmakers, and university professors and even has its own music composers, webloggers, and journalists. Intellectuals that support the Islamic Republic gives legitimacy to its ideology.
DW: What are the specifications of a regime that you describe as totalitarian?
Mehdi Khalaji: In a totalitarian system, such as the Islamic Republic, the border between the public and private role of the rulers is blurred. Seemingly there is no intention to achieve personal power and wealth; instead, the demand for power is wrapped in the attractive cover of “religious duty”. Rulers feel a “religious duty” for gaining power and for that reason they compete with each other. Hence, they pretend to have a simple lifestyle to show that they are not taking advantage of the power to gain personal wealth.
Also in the Islamic Republic system, unlike a Sultanate system, having public support is constantly needed and crucial. Without the continuous “presence of people in the scene” and showing off people’s support of the regime, in the form of seemingly civil institutions such as “Islamic Associations” in universities and factories or participation in elections, the legitimacy of government dwindles. “Public participation” within the aspirations of the government is highly encouraged. The Islamic Republic, as a totalitarian and unlike a Sultanate system, is organization-based and also tend to create organizations. Such a system that tolerates limited political and social pluralism has created a variety of structures. These structures allow for a limited amount of diversity and make the political system consolidate and durable. Furthermore there institutions and organizations train a class of elites, and allow the system to select from them fresh members and replace the older and inefficient ones with them, so it would always have a fresh group of political and intellectual elites. Finally, unlike traditional Sultanates, the Islamic Republic claimed the rule of law, at least by keeping the face; they constantly refer to their own constitution and legitimacy.
“Ayatollah Khamenei”, in this definition, means beyond a single person who can be captured by others. He is the lord of a “house” that is the core of the totalitarian regime in Iran.
DW: In your article in “Washington Post” you discussed the “anti-Ahmadinejad movement”. What type of social movement is this? But can you first explain about the “Ahmadinejad movement” and its qualities?
Mehdi Khalaji: That was a brief article written for a general audience. The term “movement” was not used in the precise sociological sense there. In fact, I am not sure whether or not we can categorize the current massive protests in the streets under the term of social “movement”. This mass has a specific demand and doesn’t have a general theoretical framework for social action. A chain of social, political and economical dissatisfaction has brought people to streets. But still there are significant confusions about the leadership, organization and ideology of this movement.
Perhaps it’s soon to judge this movement and we have to wait until seeing its consequences, effects and achievementst. What we see today might be explained as a “mass movement”. However, we could see that Ahmadinejad is obviously a symbolic indicator of what Ayatollah Khamenei is; using force, prison, privacy violations, religious superstition, and religious capitalism. But it is still unclear how this movement is going to target the heart of the totalitarianism and, for this reason, whether or not it is properly prepared in terms of intellect, language, and actions.
DW: Do you think that the coup will succeed? In other words, the “anti-Ahmadinejad movement” may be completely inhibited?
Mehdi Khalaji: It is difficult to have a prediction on Iran’s political issues. But, considering the history and the nature of leader’s methods, I believe that sooner or later Ayatollah Khamenei will make the Iranian society choose one of two radical options: either the government will establish its coup by suppressing the movement, and will move toward a situation similar to Iraq when Saddam Hussein was in power, or the movement will stay active and continue with an increased number of victims. Then its demands become more rooted and fundamental. In this case, the possibility of compromise with the government dwindles and people’s only option would be to deny and reject the entire regime.
Both possibilities can be considered as a fundamentally important move similar to the revolution back in 1979, which led to the fall of the Shah’s regime. In the 1979 revolution, a Sultanate system was overthrown. This time, the task is much more difficult – and if successful – more fundamental and profound because people are not confronting a Sultan, but they are fighting against a totalitarian system crystallized in the form of the absolute supreme leader.
Interviewer: Reza Nikjoo
Editor: Farid Vahidi
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