Tablet Magazine, February 22, 2010
During a campaign speech at the University of Uroomiyeh in northwestern Iran a few months before the June presidential election there, Mir Hossein Moussavi, the main reformist presidential candidate and now opposition leader, was interrupted by angry groups of basiji, the regime’s paramilitary enforcers, carrying pictures of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Palestinian flags. “I see the root of some [of our] problems in this hall,” Moussavi said when he saw the flags. “For instance some people are carrying a Palestinian flag. Though we like Palestine, we are in Iran and the province of Azerbaijan…. I stepped into the campaign exactly to confront this [kind of] radicalism.” Mousavi’s loss in what was widely believed to have been a rigged election brought hundreds of thousands of demonstrators to the streets, many of whom could be heard chanting, “No Gaza, no Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran.”
Might Iran’s relationship with Israel change if the democratic opposition comes to power? Though the so-called Green Movement, the pro-democracy protesters who took to the streets after the disputed election, represents a significant development in Iran’s politics, the answer is far from clear. What is unmistakable, however, is that a large swath of Iran’s population no longer accepts at face value the statements of the Islamic Republic’s leaders, who have said the Jewish State must be “wiped off the map.”
The Islamic Republic’s attitude toward the Israel emerged from a pre-revolutionary alliance of Islamic clerics, leftist intellectuals, and political militants belonging to the communist Tudeh party, the Islamic and socialist Mujahedin-e Khalq, or the People’s Holy Warriors, and the Marxist Fedayeen e-Khalq, the People’s Freedom Fighters. Since the revolution, the Islamic Republic has had no problem in improving and expanding its relation with socialist and communist regimes: Iran’s best friends today are China, Russia, and Venezuela. A main similarity between Islamic ideology and Marxism is that the concept of the nation-state is absent in both. Instead of a “nation,” Islamic ideology is based on the concept of the “Umma,” or Muslim mass, while Marxism uses the term “class.” Marxism’s international class conflict between the proletariat and bourgeoisie parallels the conflict in Islamic ideology between the Muslim Umma, also called the mustazafin, in English “the oppressed,” and the mustakberin, in English “non-believers,” or the arrogant ones. Just as the secretary of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union was both head of state and head of all Communists, the leader of an ideological political order like the Islamic republic does not see himself solely as head of state, but as the “ruler of the Islamic world,” or the wali-e amr-e muslimin-e jahan.
When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in 1979, he declared nationalism contrary to Islam and said “nationalism is opposed to Islam and it is the source of Muslims’ misery. Nationalists are the army of devil and are serving the superpowers and enemies of the Quran.” The Islamic rulers of Iran called the country Muslim world’s “Ummo al-Qura,” a quranic term used for Mecca that describes it as the mother of all cities. Therefore, by calling Iran the mother of all cities, they meant that they are the leaders of all Muslims and Iran is the capital of Islamic world. Just like international communism, pan-Islamic ideology defined its policies beyond national borders and legitimized political and military intervention in other countries in order to support Muslims against foes like “western imperialism” and “Jewish occupation of Israel”.
Many Muslims were attracted by this passionate new discourse, but disillusionment rapidly followed. While support for Palestinian groups as well as Shiite extremists in Lebanon and other places in the region became one of the main components of Iran’s foreign policy, there was plenty of evidence that Iran’s support and sympathy were hardly unconditional. Imam Musa Sadr, moderate charismatic Shiite leader who was the head of Shiite community—and had benefited from the Shah’s financial and political support to Lebanese Shiites—was kidnapped by the Libyan government and then disappeared in August 1978. The Islamic Republic, despite its close relationship to Libyan government and its leader, Moammar Gadhafi, did not make any effort to liberate Sadr. After more than three decades, moderate Shiites not only in Lebanon but also in other countries still wonder why Iran did not show any interest in pursuing Sadr’s case.
The situation of Sunni Muslims in Iran proved that the regime’s claim to lead all Muslims worldwide is motivated by politics rather than religious conviction. Since the Iranian revolution, Sunni Muslims in Iran, who comprise more than 10 percent of the population, suffer from systematic discrimination in various levels. Many of their leaders were executed or imprisoned without legal justification. Sunni seminaries in southwestern Iran were destroyed by the government and teachers arrested. Sunnis are banned from any significant political participation. Sunnis are not allowed to have a mosque in Tehran, even while Christians and Jews have churches and synagogues.
In foreign policy, the Iranian regime pretends that it supports Palestinians simply because they are Muslims and a Muslim cannot keep silent when he sees the sufferance of his fellow Muslim. Yet in the recent conflict between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan, Iran supported Armenia. In July 2009, when a series of violent clashes erupted between Uighur Muslims and Chinese state police, which led to the death of more than 190 Muslims, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not react to it at all—because the regime’s relationship with China took precedence.
The anti-Western approach that created common ground for Islamists and leftists during the revolution remains major component of the Islamic Republic’s public rhetoric. Israel, as the main ally of the West in the Middle East, was an immediate and appealing target on both “Islamic” and anti-capitalist grounds. Iran has had repeated conflicts with Arab countries (from Iran-Iraq war to controversy over three islands in Persian Gulf to dispute over Bahrain), which stem from four centuries of rivalry between Iranian monarchies and the Ottoman Empire. Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s leaders attempted to swing the power equation to their benefit by making an alliance with the West. After the revolution, Iran lost the West’s support and saw itself as having been forced to create a new anti-Western political alliance to restore the balance. The collapse of the Soviet Union made Islamic Republic’s leader believe that they can in fact lead an anti-Western and anti-Israeli front in the region by using pan-Islamic ideology and undermining national identity. The enmity toward Israel is not driven as much by Islamic motivation as it is by a lust for power.
Many critics of Islamic radicalism believe that both radical leftists and Islamic fundamentalists share an old communist principle, that the end justifies the means. They hold that Iran’s approach to the Palestinian issue is totally instrumentalist, and that the success of peace process will create a fundamental problem for Islamic Republic by depriving the regime of a “big enemy” to which it can attribute all its political and economic failures and use to stigmatize its opponents. Especially after three decades, the Islamic Republic can hardly explain why Islamic ideology has not realized its promises to bring worldly prosperity for every Iranian citizen—or why it has failed to resist what it calls the “cultural invasion” of the West. Iranian youth are the most Westernized in the middle east after Israel’s. Hence, the Islamic regime does not have any soft power to influence Muslims by showing them an alternate model for culture, economy, or politics.
Islamic Leaders hold that there are only two ways for becoming a superpower in the region: the way that the Shah chose, of making an alliance with the west and Israel, and the way Iranian revolutionaries have chosen, a defiant Islamic-Marxist alliance against the West and Israel. For most Iranians, the second way has proved to be economically and internationally costly with no evident success.
For many Iranians, especially the younger generation, it does not matter whether Israel is a good or legitimate country: They want Iran’s leaders to place Iran before anything else. In 2008, the Tehran city council allocated $3 million dollars to aid construction in Lebanon. This decision was widely criticized by reformist politicians as well as the general public for depriving Tehran of funds that could have gone to more pressing needs, like addressing its pollution crisis or transportation problems. A Persian proverb holds that “if a house needs light, the mosque does not deserve it.” What Iranians, especially the newer generation, care about most is not Palestine or Lebanon but the concrete economic problems of the country and integrating Iran into the global community.
What are the future prospects for Iran-Israel relations? No one can predict for sure. But what is certain is that so long as the government in Iran is not perceived by its people as legitimate, its policies, including its opposition toward Israel, will have no legitimacy either. So far, the Islamic Republic has substituted the Iranian people’s “national interests” with the “expediency of the regime,” as defined by the Supreme Leader, who considers himself the ruler of Islamic world. In a democratic Iran, “national interests” would be defined by the consensus of free political parties and an open civil society, aided by a free press.
Iran’s complicated relations with Arab countries will certainly play an important role in shaping a new government’s policy toward Israel. But Iran’s new generation has shown that it cares more about Iran’s immediate national concerns than it does about the Palestinian cause. This leaves hope that a future government of Iran would examine the Arab-Israeli conflict through the viewpoint of Iran’s “national interests” rather than the ideologically-driven “expediency” of the current regime, and reverse Iran’s current enmity with Israel.

On August 19, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad submitted his list of cabinet nominees to the Majlis (Iran’s parliament). The president’s choice of individuals clearly shows his preference for loyalty over efficiency, as he fired every minister who, while strongly supportive of him on most issues, opposed him recently on his controversial decision to appoint a family relative as first vice president. Ahmadinezhad’s drive to install loyalists involves placing members of the military and intelligence community in the cabinet, as well as in other important government position. Despite the president’s positioning, Iran’s top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, remains in firm control of the country’s vital ministries.

Cabinet Approval

On August 23, the Majlis will either approve or challenge the president’s cabinet appointments. Ahmadinezhad has a relatively free hand to choose the majority of cabinet seats, but the country’s key ministries — intelligence, interior, foreign affairs, defense, and culture and Islamic guidance — are, in all practical terms, preapproved by Khamenei before the president submits their names. As such, the Majlis is all but guaranteed to accept these particular individuals. The president is also empowered to directly appoint the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) — the individual responsible for Iran’s nuclear dossier and negotiations — but because this position is of particular importance to Khamanei, it also must be preapproved.

Economic and Foreign Affairs

Ahmadinezhad’s nominations suggest that he is not bothered by the ongoing criticism of his foreign policy and economic agenda, since the ministers of foreign affairs, industries and mines, economic affairs, cooperatives, and roads and transport will remain unchanged. Masoud Mir Kazemi, previously the oil minister, is the president’s choice to become minister of commerce. Ahmadinezhad is also expected to reappoint Said Jalili as secretary of the SCNS — a development that seemingly dims hope for a change in Iran’s nuclear strategy.

IRGC in Charge of Internal Affairs

Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said recently, “There was a perception that confronting hard threats was the top priority, but after careful study, we came to the conclusion that it was the IRGC’s duty to confront the regime’s soft threats, including cultural, economic, political, and social ones.” Ahmadinezhad’s first presidential term was characterized by the ascendance of the IRGC into Iran’s political system. Considering the makeup of the president’s new cabinet nominees, this trend — backed by Jafari’s suggestion that the IRGC should take over crucial political and cultural government positions — will continue into Ahmadinezhad’s second term:

Interior minister. Sadeq Mahsouli, the outgoing interior minister, was not renominated. Known as a “billionaire IRGC general,” Mahsouli was the main Iranian official responsible for the controversial presidential election in June. By replacing him, Ahmadinezhad may be trying to prevent further Majlis discussion of the election, since there would be considerable debate about the minister’s record. The president was likely also dissatisfied with Mahsouli’s handling of the election, with the widespread allegations of fraud and popular street demonstrations. The man nominated to succeed him, Mustafa Mohammad Najjar — a career IRGC man — was Ahmadinezhad’s defense minister for four years and has a close relationship with Khamenei.

Culture and Islamic guidance minister. Mohammad Hosseini comes from the intelligence community, and if confirmed by the Majlis, he can be counted on to follow his predecessor, Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi, in putting restrictions on publication houses, the press, the movie industry, and the arts in general.

Oil minister. Masoud Mir Kazemi was the head of IRGC Center for Fundamental Studies for many years.

Defense minister. Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi is connected to Iran’s Qods Force, and he, along with Mohsen Rezai, former IRGC commander-in-chief, and Ali Fallahian, former intelligence minister, is wanted by Interpol for involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in Argentina.

Intelligence minister. Heydar Muslehi is a cleric who was Khamenei’s representative in the IRGC and Basij militia, and was the head of Endowment and Charity Organization. He was trained in the Imam Khomeini Institute for Education and Research, which is run by Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a radical cleric in Qom. In a recent speech to Basij members, Mesbah Yazdi, who is known for his support for Ahmadinezhad, stated that “obedience to the president is obedience to the Hidden Imam and God.” Despite Muslehi’s inexperience in the intelligence business, the Majlis is not likely to question Ahmadinezhad’s decision, since Muslehi was presumably preapproved by Khamenei.

Gap Widens Between Clerics and Ahmadinezhad

Ahmadinezhad considers himself an authentic representative of pure Islamic ideology, one that has no need for clerical guidance on political issues. As such, the relationship between Ahmadinezhad and Iran’s clerical establishment has soured over the years — though not so with Khamenei, who is more of a politician than a cleric.

Ahmadinezhad’s nomination of three women to his cabinet — for the ministries of health, education, and welfare and social security — could exacerbate these tensions. Many members of the Majlis consider these female nominees unqualified, and many conservative clerics in Qom, such as Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi, see the move as a violation of Islamic law.

A major episode that revealed the depth of the clerical-Ahmadinezhad split was the president’s unconditional support of Rahim Mashai, who is closely related to Ahmadinezhad by marriage. Mashai drew the ire of the conservatives when he said that Iran has no quarrel with the people of Israel, even though it may dislike the state of Israel. In the last weeks of his first term, Ahmadinezhad appointed Mashai, then director of the Cultural Heritage Organization, as his first vice president. Facing unprecedented clerical and conservative pressure — and the opposition of many previous cabinet members — Ahmadinezhad did not reverse his decision until Khamenei intervened and forced him to do so. The president then appointed Mashai as his chief of staff, the head of the president’s office. In addition to his statements on Israel, the clerical establishment dislikes Mashai because he, along with Ahmadinezhad, believes in the imminent return of the Mahdi (the Twelfth Imam) — an event that would make the clergy superfluous.

Conclusion

Ahmadinezhad’s list of cabinet nominees reveals his self-confidence and readiness to be challenged by the predominately conservative Majlis. Leading Majlis figures have already expressed concern about Ahmadinezhad’s potential nominees, but the president ignored their objections. Reportedly, he believes that since he received more votes than all the Majlis members combined, he should not have to compromise with them. Ahamdinezhad’s new cabinet nominees are also the result of unofficial coordination with Khamenei. Although the Majlis will likely disagree with some of Ahmadinezhad’s selections, the president’s first-term policies will essentially continue into his second term, as evidenced by the same people occupying key ministries — with Khamenei’s approval — and the increasing number of IRGC and intelligence personnel taking top government positions.

This article was first published in the website of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

BY MEHDI KHALAJI , ROBERT PASTOR
Rarely does a country have such a clear choice as Iran did on June 12. On that day, nearly 40 million people voted for a president. The incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, pledged to continue his economic policies and his anti-Western, Holocaust-denying, nuclear-confrontational approach. His main opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, promised economic reform, increasing openness with the West, human rights, and nuclear negotiations.

While some polling stations were still open, the Interior Ministry declared Ahmadinejad the winner by a landslide. The opposition rejected it, and despite arrests and beatings, the protests have continued. Ahmadinejad’s and Mousavi’s supporters both proclaim their candidate won.

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But to all others, it is clear there were substantial irregularities. Although Ahmadinejad’s crackdown appears designed to end questions about his legitimacy, even conservative clerics are demanding answers from the state. Here is what we know happened — and a plan to prevent fraud in the next election.

Using even a minimal standard, there are good reasons for Iranians not to trust election results. The president-controlled Interior Ministry conducts elections in Iran. It denies opposition observers access to polling stations and counts the votes. Only half of Mousavi’s observers were permitted to observe polling stations in the capital city of Tehran; they had even less access in the rest of the country. None of the observers were permitted to see whether the ballot boxes were empty when the vote began. Nor were they permitted to accompany the mobile ballot boxes, which collected nearly one-third of the votes. And no Mousavi or impartial observers accompanied the ballot boxes from local wards to the provincial committees and finally to Tehran for the count.

Before the election, the reformists’ Committee for Safeguarding the Votes expressed concern that 54 million ballots were printed — millions more than for past elections and 8 million more than the number of eligible voters. Moreover, some ballots did not have serial numbers. About 40 million people voted, but no one accounted for the other 14 million ballots.

The Committee for Safeguarding the Votes also said it found a large number of Mousavi votes after the election, including some in the northern forests of Iran. It surmised that these votes were removed from the boxes and replaced with votes for Ahmadinejad. Mousavi himself claims he has evidence that the total number of votes exceeded the number of eligible voters by as much as 40 percent in more than 170 constituencies. Some of the party observers claim ballots for Ahmadinejad featured the same handwriting in the same ink.

These accusations of fraud are credible. Even the conservative Guardian Council has acknowledged that as many as 3 million votes might have been fraudulent. But, given the way the system operates, no one knows with certainty how many votes were legitimate and how much fraud occurred.

In many other countries with rigged electoral systems, opposition members boycott. That did not happen in Iran — and now, millions are risking their lives to compel the authorities to count their votes accurately. As the protest moves to its next phase, the country could stave off a crisis by agreeing to four fundamental electoral safeguards.

The single most important step is to transfer election responsibilities from the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council to a nonpartisan and independent national election commission. Iran should also create a nonpartisan elections court, composed of judges and lawyers. All the major political parties should have a veto on nominees so as to ensure that the judges are acceptable to all the parties.

Second, the Election Commission should certify the candidates according to clear and fair criteria, and they should prevent any intimidation, and guarantee access to the entire electoral process by domestic and international election observers. Domestic observers are absolutely essential to assuring a free election and detecting fraud; and international observers help the process by magnifying the voice of the domestic observers.

Third, the ballot boxes should be opened for all to see before the election begins, and observers should accompany mobile and other ballot boxes through the day.

Finally, counting should occur at every polling site. Observers should watch the count, sign the declaration of results, and keep a copy. The final announcement should publicize the results of each of the polling stations, so that people can detect any vote discrepancy.

Much else needs to be done to build confidence in the electoral process and assure votes are counted fairly. But if these four fundamental elements of electoral reform are accepted and implemented, the next election in Iran would be much freer and fairer. The reforms would also allow Iranians and the world to locate and denounce any fraud. The opposition has asked for a new election, but without these four reforms, that is unlikely to be any fairer than the previous one. Only with such reforms can Iranians know when their votes count, and when their voices are stolen.

What role should the West and the United States play at this time? It is obvious that Ahmadinejad and his allies would like to blame all of Iran’s problems on the West — especially the United States and Britain. The government’s case against the opposition is that its members are surrogates of the West. For these countries to be seen as meddling in Iran’s affairs would be counter-productive.

On the other hand, the democratic community cannot be silent; it needs to find the most appropriate and legitimate way to express its support for democracy in Iran and elsewhere. The best way to reconcile these two somewhat conflicted messages — avoid meddling but provide more support for Iran’s democrats — is if the world’s great Muslim democracies, which have diplomatic relations with Iran — like Indonesia and Lebanon — to carry the message. Those countries should propose a resolution to the U.N. Human Rights Council, calling for an end to repression and for genuine electoral reform.

It now appears that Ahmadinejad will try to consolidate a hard-line government and will ruthlessly suppress all legitimate protest movements. If he chooses this path, he will further undermine his efforts to win legitimacy.

The battle for reform has just begun. The only question is when it will prevail. Within Iran’s regime, a group of clerics holds that the Islamic Republic should be genuinely democratic. In the end, the major hope for democracy will depend on their acknowledging the flaws in the electoral system and deciding to reform it.

Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the author of Apocalyptic Politics; on the Rationality of Iranian Policy.

Robert Pastor is a professor and co-director of the Center for Democracy and Election Management at American University. He developed the election-monitoring initiatives of the Carter Center in Atlanta and has organized the observation of elections in about forty countries.

This article  was first published in Foreign Policy

This interview was first published in the Foriegn Policy website.

Born in Qom, Iran, as the son of an ayatollah, Mehdi Khalaji knows what the long path to Shiite scholarship looks like. His father dreamed that he might someday join the ranks of these high scholars as an ayatollah, and from 1986 to 2000, Khalaji studied theology and jurisprudence in the traditional city center. Almost a decade after a difficult decision to leave and pursue his work in journalism independent scholarly research, Khalaji, now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, spoke with Foreign Policy’s Elizabeth Dickinson about what life in the seminary is like, and why ayatollahs are not made; they are born. Excerpts:

On growing up and entering seminary:

I was sent to the seminary when I was very young — when I was 11 years old. My father was hoping that someday I would become a grand ayatollah. But I betrayed my father’s dreams and I got out of seminary, finally. I studied until the highest level, when you attend courses of the important ayatollahs. I studied Shiite theology, jurisprudence and Islamic philosophy.

Since my father was an ayatollah, I’d been familiar with a clerical life. When [former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini came to Iran in February 1979, after two months he came to Qom, my father was the one who welcomed him publically. My father was well-known, and he had a good relationship with other revolutionaries. Actually my father was in prison before the revolution.

On daily life in seminary:

The daily life of a religious student in my time was much different from what it used to be before the revolution, and from what it is now.

Life was traditional. You get up early morning because you have to pray. Many good clerics even get up at two or three o’clock in the early morning to pray. After the morning prayer, for example at 5 o’clock, 6 o’clock, they start to read. And at 7 o’clock, the courses start. Usually the courses are 45 minutes. Each student chooses a fellow [student] to discuss each course with him each day. Sometimes I play the role of teacher for you; I teach you the same thing I was taught yesterday. If I say anything wrong, you correct me. Tomorrow you’re going to be my teacher. In this way, [students] repeat the courses and correct each others’ possible misunderstandings. Usually, you take three or four courses per day.

At noon, you go back to your home or, if you live in a traditional school, you go to the school. You eat something, and you get some rest. At four o’clock, you start your classes until sunset. At sunset, you pray your sunset prayer. After that, you go home and you start to read. You go to bed early because you have to get up early.

That was the typical life at that time. But now, everything is mistaught, after [current Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei injected lots of money into the clerical establishments. They destroyed the traditional structure and the educational program. They created some schools that are more like a military base rather than a traditional, clerical school. And every morning, [the students] do something like a parade, which is a military practice, not a clerical practice.

Masoumyeh Madrassa (clerical school); Qom

On reasons for entering seminary:

In my time, nobody went to the seminary to gain money or credits, because in the society it wasn’t one of the favorite jobs you could have. Before the revolution, [attendance] was based on religious convictions and your own personal decision — the feeling of religious responsibility. After revolution, people were agreeing to go to seminary because they had been revolutionary idealists. They were looking at the seminary as a place for ideological training.

But gradually, clerics were put in charge of sensitive positions. Being a cleric meant that you could gain lots of political power and economic advantages. So now, people are not going to the seminary for the study of religion; people are going because the seminary became a place for training employees for the government. They are going to become wealthy and to become close to the political circles. After 30 years, the new generation of the seminary is intellectually very poor but economically very rich — just the opposite of what it used to be.

On who can enter seminary:

When I entered the seminary, there was no ideological control; everybody was free to enter the seminary, provided that he attend the courses and pass the exams. But if you want to enter the seminary since Khamenei came to power 20 years ago, you have to pass an ideological investigation. They investigate where you are coming from, how your family is in terms of loyalty to the government, whether any member of your family was involved in political activities, and whether your family is religious or not.

What I’ve said in some of my writings is that Khamenei has modernized the seminary, bureaucratized the seminary, and through modernization, put control over the seminary. We were free to attend any course we wanted. But now, it’s like entering the military. In my time, everyone was allowed to teach, and I was free to choose my teacher: volunteer teacher, volunteer student. Now? You cannot choose your teacher, nor your student.

On leaving the seminary:

I’m part of the generation that entered the seminary after the [Iranian] revolution. We had some illusions about Islamic ideology, and we thought that the Islamic ideology was like its leader’s promise — able to provide worldly happiness, and otherworldly salvation. Islamic ideology provides everything that other ideologies provide for you, like economic growth, freedom of speech, and cultural flourishing, but there is also an added value: While liberalism doesn’t promise anything for you when you die, Islamic ideology will provide you with salvation in the afterlife. This is what we were thinking — this utopian world that we would believe in. But after a decade, we found that the result was not so promising.

Actually, when clerics got power, they started to eliminate other groups, political groups, and political figures who were involved in the revolution. For example, many prominent clerics lived [near us in Qom], and our next-door neighbor was a cleric who had been a member of the parliament since I was a kid. Suddenly, we found out that he had been executed. He had some boys, I think one or two, who were the same age I was at that time. We’d been watching their suffering, and it was really painful. Many clerics who really believed in Islamic ideology and were active in the period of the revolution — just because they criticized Khomeini, they’d been kicked out, put in jail, executed, or tortured. This was one of the reasons that we thought “OK, this wouldn’t work. What we wanted was not this; this is against the romantic perception of the Islamic utopia.”

Second, what was very influential for me was the emergence of the religious intellectuals, especially Abdolkarim Soroush. Dr. Soroush started to come to Qom when I was 17 years old. I was going to his class every Thursday in a small house. We were discreetly attending, because clerics were mad at him for teaching a different interpretation of Islam. Dr. Soroush opened the eyes of me and many other clerics of my generation to modernity, to Western philosophy, and how to look at Islam from a modern perspective.

Finally, I started to study Western philosophy and especially Immanuel Kant, who was very influential for me, and the modern philosophers like Nietzsche and other philosophers like him — Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, Derrida, and so on. Through philosophy, I started to criticize theology.

On Moqtada al-Sadr:

Nobody can decide to go to the seminary and study and become an ayatollah. Becoming an ayatollah is not something like getting a degree. You can get a Ph.D. in philosophy. It’s possible. But in the seminary, an ayatollah is the equivalent to a theoretician. We have thousands of people in the world who have Ph.D.s in philosophy, but we have few people who are really philosophers — who introduce new theories and philosophies.

We have many people who have studied 30 years, they are very old — like 70 years old — but they are not an ayatollah yet. You can be an ayatollah when you are young or when you are middle aged, provided that you are very intelligent and you study very hard, and you are a dedicated person. You just don’t want to get it quickly and go back to Iraq and get involved again in the Mahdi Army. It’s not the way that system works.

It is extremely ridiculous to hear Moqtada al-Sadr say “I’m studying to become an ayatollah.” It really doesn’t make sense in any language but English. If [he says] this in Farsi or Arabic, everybody ridicules him. So he can say this only to foreign media.

Also, if you want to study at the highest level in theology, whether in Qom or Najaf or other seminaries, you have to attend the important courses taught by big figures. Big figures don’t teach clandestine[ly]; they teach in the mosque, and many people attempt their courses. In the course of the last few years when Moqtada claims that he has been in Qom to study religion in order to become an ayatollah, nobody has seen him in these courses. So where is he? I don’t know. What he does, I don’t know. But we have to be very clear: Nobody talks about him because nobody sees him in Qom.

translated by kaveh_r | source: DW-World originally published on June 16

What has happened in Iran? Is it one of the usual conflicts between political factions? A manifestation of the ongoing internal dispute over the share of power? In an article published in “Washington Post”, Mehdi Khalaji talks about a «coup». This is an interview with him.

On Monday, June 15, Washington Post published an article by Mehdi Khalaji, Islam expert, political analyst, and a researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His article discusses the current upheavals after presidential elections in Iran. The underlying thesis of the article is expressed in it’s title “Khamenei’s coup”. Our interview with Mehdi Khalaji focuses on this thesis.
DW: Mr. Khalaji, in your article published in the Washington Post you referred to what Mir Hossein Mousavi called “Magical elections” as “Khamenei’s coup”. Other political analysts, however, speculate that a group of revolutionary guards commanders predetermined the result of the election, and that the supreme leader was under their control in some way, or was faced with a fait accompli. What is your argument for the invalidity of this hypothesis?
Mehdi Khalaji: Ayatollah Khamenei, the official and absolute supreme leader, is not just a single person, but the fundamental pillar of an systematic establishment. Military–security networks, religious institutions and organizations (especially the clergy), large-scale business enterprises not under the government’s control, and the judicial system are all part of this integrated and entangled system. Ayatollah Khamenei , as the embodiment of the “absolute supreme leadership” [or Absolute Guardianship of Islamic Jurists (velayat-e motlaghe-ye faghih in Persian)] ideology, is the thread that runs through all these dispersed parts and gives them unity and cohesion.
He is the cornerstone, symbol and the main focus of this establishment. Without his leadership, military commanders would lack ideology and would be unable to communicate with other components of the collection. Without him, there would be a barrier in communication between military-security institutions and the lower layers of society. Complex economic networks would be disintegrated as well.
Ayatollah Khamenei is just as much a “captive” by the military commanders as they are his captives. Without his commanders, he would be nothing, as without him, the commanders would be nothing. The association of this huge hierarchy is based on the supreme leader’s house [what his office is called, a normal phrase used for the offices of Grand Ayatollh’s too]. The boundaries of his house, however, are beyond its physical walls, its invisible walls extend from the streets of Qom [a religious city, largest center of Islamic schools in Iran] to the black lines of the Kayhan newspaper, from Evin prison to his representative offices in colleges and universities. Any small crack in these walls would destroy the entire supreme leader’s house.
“Khamenei’s coup” refers to the wrathful dominance of this hierarchy over other weak “democratic” organs of the Islamic Republic such as the president’s and the parliament. On June 12th, a coup, in the form of an election, happened to bring three decades of grueling challenge between these establishments and weak strains of democratic organs in the Islamic Republic to a determining point.
DW: Does this mean that now the “Sultan” has complete dominance?
Mehdi Khalaji: The supreme leader is not a “Sultan” and the Islamic Republic system is not a Sultanate. Although the system of government tends to run on hierarchy orders, but not all such forms of governments should be reduced to a “Sultanate”. The Islamic Republic is a totalitarian establishment. A totalitarian system is a much more sophisticated and layered system than a Sultanate. It’s more difficult to both establish and overthrow it.
If the Islamic Republic was a Sultanate, it would not have been based on ideology and would not have generated a supporting intellectual disciple. The Islamic Republic has its own Grand Ayatollahs, its own filmmakers, and university professors and even has its own music composers, webloggers, and journalists. Intellectuals that support the Islamic Republic gives legitimacy to its ideology.
DW: What are the specifications of a regime that you describe as totalitarian?
Mehdi Khalaji: In a totalitarian system, such as the Islamic Republic, the border between the public and private role of the rulers is blurred. Seemingly there is no intention to achieve personal power and wealth; instead, the demand for power is wrapped in the attractive cover of “religious duty”. Rulers feel a “religious duty” for gaining power and for that reason they compete with each other. Hence, they pretend to have a simple lifestyle to show that they are not taking advantage of the power to gain personal wealth.
Also in the Islamic Republic system, unlike a Sultanate system, having public support is constantly needed and crucial. Without the continuous “presence of people in the scene” and showing off people’s support of the regime, in the form of seemingly civil institutions such as “Islamic Associations” in universities and factories or participation in elections, the legitimacy of government dwindles. “Public participation” within the aspirations of the government is highly encouraged. The Islamic Republic, as a totalitarian and unlike a Sultanate system, is organization-based and also tend to create organizations. Such a system that tolerates limited political and social pluralism has created a variety of structures. These structures allow for a limited amount of diversity and make the political system consolidate and durable. Furthermore there institutions and organizations train a class of elites, and allow the system to select from them fresh members and replace the older and inefficient ones with them, so it would always have a fresh group of political and intellectual elites. Finally, unlike traditional Sultanates, the Islamic Republic claimed the rule of law, at least by keeping the face; they constantly refer to their own constitution and legitimacy.
“Ayatollah Khamenei”, in this definition, means beyond a single person who can be captured by others. He is the lord of a “house” that is the core of the totalitarian regime in Iran.
DW: In your article in “Washington Post” you discussed the “anti-Ahmadinejad movement”. What type of social movement is this? But can you first explain about the “Ahmadinejad movement” and its qualities?
Mehdi Khalaji: That was a brief article written for a general audience. The term “movement” was not used in the precise sociological sense there. In fact, I am not sure whether or not we can categorize the current massive protests in the streets under the term of social “movement”. This mass has a specific demand and doesn’t have a general theoretical framework for social action. A chain of social, political and economical dissatisfaction has brought people to streets. But still there are significant confusions about the leadership, organization and ideology of this movement.
Perhaps it’s soon to judge this movement and we have to wait until seeing its consequences, effects and achievementst. What we see today might be explained as a “mass movement”. However, we could see that Ahmadinejad is obviously a symbolic indicator of what Ayatollah Khamenei is; using force, prison, privacy violations, religious superstition, and religious capitalism. But it is still unclear how this movement is going to target the heart of the totalitarianism and, for this reason, whether or not it is properly prepared in terms of intellect, language, and actions.
DW: Do you think that the coup will succeed? In other words, the “anti-Ahmadinejad movement” may be completely inhibited?
Mehdi Khalaji: It is difficult to have a prediction on Iran’s political issues. But, considering the history and the nature of leader’s methods, I believe that sooner or later Ayatollah Khamenei will make the Iranian society choose one of two radical options: either the government will establish its coup by suppressing the movement, and will move toward a situation similar to Iraq when Saddam Hussein was in power, or the movement will stay active and continue with an increased number of victims. Then its demands become more rooted and fundamental. In this case, the possibility of compromise with the government dwindles and people’s only option would be to deny and reject the entire regime.
Both possibilities can be considered as a fundamentally important move similar to the revolution back in 1979, which led to the fall of the Shah’s regime. In the 1979 revolution, a Sultanate system was overthrown. This time, the task is much more difficult – and if successful – more fundamental and profound because people are not confronting a Sultan, but they are fighting against a totalitarian system crystallized in the form of the absolute supreme leader.
Interviewer: Reza Nikjoo
Editor: Farid Vahidi

this article first was published as a Policy Watch at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

While a handful of marginal clerics and religious groups dispute the official result of Iran’s recent presidential election, the Shiite clerical establishment as a whole currently supports Iran’s top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Although this support has been demonstrated through silence, the fact that most Shiite clerics have not intervened in the public debate over the election or the government’s use of force against protesters has been particularly effective in strengthening Khamenei’s position.
The Establishment
Iran’s clerical establishment consists of about 200,000 members, and its hierarchy includes many midlevel clerics called hojjat ol-eslam (“proof of Islam”) and around a thousand ayatollahs (“sign of God”), who are leaders recognized for their scholarship. Ranking above ayatollahs are roughly fifteen grand ayatollahs, who are revered as sources of emulation, or as religious guides, for many followers.
Khamenei was a mere hojjat ol-eslam when he was elevated to the rank of ayatollah, in a controversial move aimed at making him constitutionally fit to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, as Iran’s principal leader. Khamenei’s authority stems from the principal of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which combines political and religious power into one supreme authority.
Dissent Only from the Margins
The ayatollahs in Qom and Isfahan who have criticized the recent presidential election are isolated, with no significant role in the clerical establishment; they lack both financial resources and religious popularity. Although these ayatollahs held key political and juridical positions during the first decades of the Islamic Republic, they were sidelined first by Khomeini and then later by Khamenei.
A small marginal group, the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom Seminary, is the only clerical group that has explicitly referred to the presidential election as illegitimate. The association was founded in 1998, and its central council consists of eighteen midranking clerics and one ayatollah. This group plays no role in the administration of the clerical establishment, and none of its members are considered to be sources of emulation. The association was originally created to support former president Muhammad Khatami, but its support has remained symbolic rather than practical. The group’s secretary, the controversial Seyyed Hossein Moussavi Tabrizi, was involved in the execution of many of the regime’s opponents and political prisoners while he was the general prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court during the first decade of Islamic Republic,
Coopting the Clerical Establishment
Iran’s current clerical establishment has little similarity to what it was prior to 1979 Islamic Revolution. Historically, the clerical class was a semiautonomous political institution with independent financial resources from religious taxes collected directly from followers. But after the revolution, and especially since Khamenei became leader twenty years ago, the establishment became totally dependent on the government’s financial resources, social authority, networking, organization, and political status. Iran’s leader is not only the head of the judiciary, intelligence services, and the armed forces, he is also the head of Iran’s Shiite clerics.
Clerics receive hefty regular stipends from the government, and many ayatollahs have exclusive privileges for numerous profit-making transactions. The government has modernized and bureaucratized the clerical establishment by creating the Center for Seminary Management, which is under direct supervision of Khamenei and is in full control of clerical finances, the seminary’s educational system, and the political direction of the establishment. Even Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, along with other influential Shiite leaders, allegedly runs his offices within the framework of the Center.
To control clerics politically, the government created the Special Court of Clerics — an organization that works outside the judiciary branch of government and is headed by an appointee of Khamenei — to deal with dissenting clerics. This independent court does not operate within the country’s legal system; it has own set of procedures and maintains its own prisons in most Iranian cities.
Politically defiant clerics who oppose certain government decisions work outside the clerical establishment and usually have a track record of supporting Iran’s reform movement. Although several prominent reformist figures, such as former president Muhammad Khatami and former speaker of the Iranian parliament Mehdi Karrubi, are clerics, their words and actions have little or no impact on the clerical establishment and pose no threat of causing political splits.
Conclusion
The Shiite clerical establishment, which stretches across the Middle East, is highly unlikely to initiate any sort of opposition to Khamenei’s authority. Various Shiite leaders may not be happy with the Iranian government’s policies, but publicizing their differences might jeopardize the social, political, and financial advantages they now receive from Iran. For example, during his Friday sermon immediately after the Iranian election, Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Fazlallah, a prominent Shiite ayatollah in Lebanon, stated his support for the government’s official result and voiced his admiration of the Iranian people for their participation in the election. In Iraq, al-Sistani kept silent about the election result and has not reacted to the postelection crisis. Both ayatollahs have offices in Qom and benefit from the support of the Iranian government.
Inside Iran, support for Khamenei, although mostly silent, is also evident. Morteza Moqtadai, the head of Center for Seminary Management, announced that the election result was approved by “God and the Hidden Imam,” and stated that Khamenei’s words are the “Hidden Imam’s words; when he says there was no manipulation in the election, he should be heard as the ultimate arbiter.”
Khamenei — for the moment — is in a strong position. The clerical establishment’s prevailing silence, however, could eventually work against him. If the political tide begins to turn, the establishment could be rendered powerless and its support ineffective, leaving Khamenei and his followers in a vulnerable position.

This article was first published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on June 1, 2009

On June 4, Iran will mark the twentieth anniversary of Ali Khamenei’s appointment as the leader of Iran. While international attention is focused on the June 12 presidential elections, the winner of that contest will remain subordinate to Khamenei in power and importance, despite the latter’s low profile. Lacking the charisma and religious credentials of his predecessor, Khamenei has managed to attain his powerful position by taking control of key government agencies and building a robust bureaucracy under his direction. Understanding Khamenei’s role in Iran’s complicated governmental system and how he wields his understated power will be key for the United States as it undertakes a new strategy for dealing with Tehran.
A Weak Starting Point

When he assumed the leadership in 1989, Khamenei faced three serious obstacles to his legitimacy: he lacked the religious credentials required by the original constitution, he had not exercised significant political authority in his capacity as president, and a questionable selection process cast doubt on the legality of his appointment.

According to the original version of the constitution, the leader was not only supposed to be a religious authority (mujtahid) but also a source of emulation (marja or a mujtahid with religious followers). Khamenei, who had never even been recognized as mujtahid, let alone a marja, and whose religious knowledge was in question, did not appear to measure up to this requirement.

At the time of his appointment by the Assembly of Experts, Khamenei was serving his eighth year as Iran’s president, a largely symbolic office that offered him little power. Other prominent figures in the Islamic Republic, such as Majlis speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the judiciary Abdulkarim Moussavi Ardebili, and prime minister Mir Hossein Moussavi, were all equally powerful, if not more so. Moreover, Khamenei was not particularly close to the previous leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, until after the revolution. Rafsanjani was among Khomeini’s trusted appointments to his original Revolutionary Council; Khamenei joined only after the council decided to add members.

Several months before Khomeini’s death, however, he dismissed his officially designated successor, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, and ordered a constitutional review. The review aimed to remove the marja requirement, which would allow a mujtahid to become leader. Unfortunately for Khamenei, who was neither a marja nor a mujtahid, Khomeini died and the Assembly of Experts appointed Khamenei as his successor before the revised constitution was ratified, leaving the appointment in question.

Creating a New Generation of Politicians

Khomeini’s charisma and authority enabled him to exercise power without an established bureaucracy, but Khamenei was aware of the essential differences of his circumstances and leadership. Since the revised constitution gave much more authority to the president than did the original, Rafsanjani exercised more power than his predecessor, but Khamenei still tried to expand his authority at Rafsanjani’s expense. From the outset, he created a colossal bureaucracy through which to maintain power.

One important part of this effort was to take control of existing agencies. He overcame his lowly standing among veteran Islamic Republic officials and within the clerical establishment by making use of his connections in the Ministry of Intelligence and in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, then president Khamenei developed ties with these institutions, which were expanding their authority beyond the security sphere, becoming involved in economic activities as well. The end of the war and the return of commanders to their cities allowed Khamenei to create a power base outside of conventional political institutions.

Khamenei succeeded in recruiting young, loyal politicians by bringing military commanders and intelligence agents into the political arena. Among the figures who emerged from Khamenei’s circle were Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Majlis, Said Jalili, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, the president, Ezzatollah Zarghami, the head of state radio and television, and Mohammad Forouzandeh, the head of the Oppressed Foundation. These appointments essentially converted organizations like the IRGC into economic-political-military-intelligence conglomerations responsible only to the leader.

By bringing in a new generation of politicians and gradually marginalizing the veteran Islamic Republic officials who were not willing to work for him, Khamenei concentrated power under his authority. He became head of all three branches of the government and the state media, as well as the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, including the police, the army, and the IRGC. In the process, he has transformed the clerical establishment from a traditional religious institution into an ideological apparatus and government proxy. As leader, he also controls the country’s most lucrative institutions, such as the Imam Reza Shrine and the Oppressed Foundation. He has used the funds they generate to advance a political agenda both inside Iran and abroad, building dozens of centers, foundations, and Islamic banks with political, cultural, social, and economic missions.

House of the Leader

In addition to taking over existing agencies, Khamenei also began building up his personal office or “house.” Traditionally, the head of a religious authority’s office was either a son or a prominent cleric; for example, Khomeini worked from his home, receiving information and issuing orders primarily through his son, Ahmad. In contrast, Khamenei created an extensive bureaucracy and transformed the “house of the leader” into a vast and sophisticated institution, with thousands of employees working in different departments.

Since his sons were too young, and prominent clerics were unwilling to take the position, Khamenei chose a low-ranking cleric, Mohammad (Gholam Hossein) Mohammdi Golpayegani, to lead his office. Not surprisingly, Golpayegani also had a strong intelligence background. He was one of the founders of Iran’s intelligence service and served, among other positions, as the intelligence ministry’s deputy on parliamentary affairs under Khomeini.

Khamenei also reached into the intelligence services for other significant appointments in the house of the leader. For example, he selected Asghar Mir Hejazi, another founder of the intelligence service, as the head of his intelligence department. Mir Hejazi began his career as a commander in the Committee of the Islamic Revolution (a post-revolutionary military organization parallel to the police that was later disbanded), and served as a deputy in the intelligence ministry’s international affairs office before moving over to Khamenei’s office. The appointments of Golpayegani and Mir Hejazi were also significant because, though low-level clerics, neither came directly from the seminary, a departure from Khomeini’s practice.

Khamenei turned the house of the leader into a focal point of power. It is not only the de facto headquarters of Iran’s armed forces, but also the actual headquarters of the intelligence ministry, the coordinator of the three branches of government, and the manager of economic matters, especially of the supreme leader’s organizations. It also oversees the Leader’s Army (Sepah Vali-e Amr), a special military unit of 21,000 soldiers under the supervision of the IRGC, responsible for the security of the leader’s house.

Foreign Policy Institutions

To direct Iranian foreign policy, Khamenei created new committees and entities under his control, with the Foreign Ministry relegated to mostly administrative issues. These offices also drew on Khamenei’s military connections. For example, the Military Advisors Center consists of former high-ranking IRGC and army commanders, such as former IRGC commander-in-chief General Rahim Yahya Safavi, former army commander-in-chief General Ali Shahbazi, and former head of police Hedayat Lotfian. The Supreme Council for the National Defense (SCND) also plays an important role. The secretary of the SCND is formally appointed by the president but in reality is chosen by the leader. Khamenei also has other trusted advisors, such as Ali Akbar Velayati, who served sixteen years as the minister of foreign affairs. Velayati was Khamenei’s first choice for prime minister in 1982 but failed to gain parliamentary approval and instead became foreign minister under Mir Hossein Moussavi (a candidate in the upcoming presidential election).

Not Omnipotent, but Most Powerful

In the traditional monarchic despotism of Iran, the shah or king was not omnipotent; he was forced to balance power with other social authorities such as clerics, landlords, and tribal heads. Such rulers used the royal court to establish and maintain their preeminence in all aspects of governance. Following Khomeini’s revolutionary break with this tradition, Khamenei has reproduced this prerevolutionary, patriarchal structure of political leadership.

During his twenty years in power, Khamenei has managed to overcome his initial obstacles and transform the conventional house of religious authority into a bureaucratic powerhouse. As a result, Iranian decisionmaking is no longer shared, as it was in the last years of Khomeini’s life, especially with regard to war. The house of the leader makes the main decisions today, whether political or military, domestic or foreign policy related, and Khamenei is the principal decisionmaker. Khamenei relies more on his own hand-picked men when making major decisions than on elected members of government. Khamenei readily admits that he has the final say on foreign policy issues. As his advisor Ali Akbar Velayati wrote last year, “a European asked me recently ‘Who rules Iran?’ The response is clear. If something is related to strategic and fundamental issues, according to the constitution, which was approved by a referendum, the leader has the final say.”

The United States must keep in mind the authority of the leader as it begins a new approach to dealing with the Iranian regime. While President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad is the public face of Iran, the real power lays with Khamenei, a skilled behind-the-scenes operator. Finding a way to directly engage Khamenei, while not letting him hide behind the more visible president, will be a critical challenge for Washington in the months ahead.

Mehdi Khalaji speaks in a roundtable-style special hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the political crisis in Iran, hosted by John Kerry
Watch U.S. Senate video of this event (the hearing begins at 36:30).

Washington Post, June 15, 2009

Large-scale manipulation of Friday’s presidential election in Iran was to be expected, but few could have predicted that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had a military coup in mind. By declaring incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the winner, Khamenei conveyed a clear message to the West: Iran is digging in on its nuclear program, its support to Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas, and its defiant regional policies.
In the streets of Tehran and other major cities, riot police, members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij militias are battling reformist demonstrators who are protesting the results. The government has cut Internet connections and cellphone service and jammed foreign satellite TV and radio broadcasts. Most foreign journalists in Iran to cover the election were expelled after the voting ended. More than 100 leaders of the reform movement have been detained so far, and others are under what amounts to house arrest.

Even though Khamenei asked the candidates not to dispute the results, a reformist group called the Council of Militant Clerics, led by former president Mohammad Khatami, apologized to the people for not being able to protect their votes and asked the government to overturn this result and hold new elections. In statements Sunday, two of the presidential candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, asked people to continue their “nonviolent demonstration” throughout the country and criticized the government for using violence against demonstrators.

More than 80 percent of Iranian voters turned out primarily because Ahmadinejad’s three challengers succeeded in mobilizing Iran’s silent majority, especially in the two weeks before the election. All three warned explicitly about the risks of Ahmadinejad’s domestic and foreign policies. Although Ahmadinejad enjoys the support of Iran’s powerful supreme leader, in the final two weeks before the election all reputable polls inside and outside of Iran showed that Ahmadinejad’s popularity had decreased significantly — particularly following televised campaign debates — even in rural areas and among the urban working class.

Ahmadinejad took office four years ago through an engineered election. This time Khamenei announced — before the official Interior Ministry count had been issued — that Ahmadinejad had won more than 24 million votes, surpassing even the record set by Khatami 12 years ago.

Mousavi and Karroubi have called the announced results “ridiculous.” Mousavi said Sunday that invalidating the election is now the only way to restore the people’s trust. The Iranian supreme leader’s post-election statement, in which he described a “people’s epic” through a “completely fair and free election,” did not prevent shocked followers of reformist candidates from rioting over the weekend to chants of “down with the dictator.”

The challengers also asked people to go to the roof of their homes and shout “Allah is great,” a slogan that reminds people of the 1979 revolution. Mousavi has invited protesters to gather this afternoon on Enghelab Square in Tehran; gatherings are expected in more than 20 other cities.

The current social solidarity and political unity in Iran is unprecedented since the revolution. Banners, headbands and signs in green, the color of the anti-Ahmadinejad movement, were prominent before the election and are still on display. No one can predict where this situation will lead and whether Khamenei’s nightmare of a “velvet revolution” will come true.

Earlier this year, in his message on the occasion of the Iranian New Year (Nowruz), Barack Obama became the first U.S. president since the hostage crisis to address “Iranian leaders” and the “Islamic Republic” rather than the Iranian “regime.” The Obama administration had been careful not to take any position that could be seen as supporting a particular candidate in the Iranian election. Obama’s Iran team was surely watching the decreasing support for Ahmadinejad and waiting to see what would happen. While Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and leaders of the Palestinian Hamas and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movements were among the first to congratulate Ahmadinejad, people everywhere, certainly including in Iran, expect the United States to speak out.

This military coup is a turning point in Iran’s domestic and foreign policies that the West cannot ignore. The U.S. reaction in particular is meaningful not only for Iran’s democratic movement but for all democrats in Islamic countries who suffer under autocratic governments. In coordination with European and other nations, the United States should respond to the message being sent by Iran’s supreme leader by condemning the election and backing the Iranian people’s demand for a free and fair revote under the supervision of international observers.

Iran’s people have a living memory of U.S. involvement in the 1950s coup against the government of Mohammed Mossadegh. They expect the Obama administration not to make the same mistake at this crucial time in U.S.-Iranian relations by recognizing the coup carried out under the cover of this election.

It will be easier to bring an end to Iran’s controversial nuclear program and defiant foreign policy working with a democratic Iran rather than the military government that is in power. Iranian society will not forget this historic moment and is watching to see how the free world reacts.

NYTimes.com, June 18, 2009

The New York Times convened an online panel of four Middle East experts to discuss the Obama administration’s response to the landslide victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the June 12 Iranian presidential elections. The following is a contribution by Washington Institute senior fellow Mehdi Khalaji, who focuses on Iranian politics and the politics of Shiite groups in the Middle East. Read the entire discussion on the Times’s website.
Let Protesters Know the U.S. Cares

Only before the June 12 elections could I have agreed with President Obama’s statement on Tuesday that “the difference between Ahmadinejad and Moussavi in terms of their actual policies may not be as great as has been advertised.”

What is happening these days in Iran has little to do with Mir Hussein Moussavi’s policies or background. What matters now for the Iranians participating in the daily demonstrations, even those who did not vote or voted for the other reformist candidate, Mehdi Karroubi, is not Mr. Moussavi’s agenda as he expressed during his campaign but rather what he represents: the Iranian people’s resentment of the militarization of the government, the humiliation and isolation of the nation on the world stage.

Despite Ayatollah Ali Khamenei being the one who has the final say on the Islamic Republic’s foreign, nuclear and military policies, Mr. Moussavi, in his televised debates before the election, criticized the government’s economic agenda and political and cultural suppression. He also challenged Iran’s foreign polices and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory statements about the decline of the U.S. and the annihilation of Israel.

Close

The Obama administration’s caution in passing judgment about the legitimacy of the election is wise. It will do best if it watches and waits for the final decision of the Iranian supreme leader. But President Obama should make it clear in his public statements that there is a big difference between a President Ahmadinejad and a President Moussavi because two things cannot be ignored by the U.S. administration.

First, if we assume that Ayatollah Khamenei is the real power in Iran, there should be an explanation for his persistent support of Mr. Ahmadinejad in the last four years despite strong criticism of the president’s policies from a wide spectrum of reformist and conservative Iranian politicians. There are many reasons to believe that Ayatollah Khamenei sees a fundamental difference between Mr. Moussavi and Mr. Ahmadinejad.

Second, had Mr. Moussavi won the election in the same way that Mohammad Khatami did 12 years ago, the supreme leader could have used all the same tools to weaken him. But in the current situation, if Mr. Moussavi comes to power out of the mass mobilization of Iranian society, it would mean the defeat of not only Ayatollah Khamenei but the institution of the “ruling jurist” and the agenda of the militarization of the government. Mr. Moussavi would be the first president in the history of the Islamic Republic who comes to power by defeating “the real power” in Iran.

What President Obama should to do now is focus more on the people in the streets rather than the election itself. He should condemn the Iranian government for using violence against the peaceful demonstrators no matter who would come to office as a president. According to several sources in Iran, more than 30 demonstrators have been killed and at least 150 leaders of the reform movement have been arrested in the last few days. President Obama’s strong statement in favor of human rights can have a significant impact on preventing further arrests and bloodshed.